Iran’s Patterns of Information Manipulation: "Women, Life, Freedom" Protests (2022)
This is an English summary of a report published on Factnameh following the 2022 “Women, Life, Freedom” protests. While the report focused on the Islamic Republic’s patterns and tactics of information manipulation during that period, these same tactics continue to be used by the Iranian government during crises or whenever it seeks to advance its own narrative.
The 2022 nationwide protests in Iran, sparked by the death of Mahsa (Jina) Amini in police custody, marked one of the most extensive, longest, and most violently repressed waves of demonstrations in the history of the Islamic Republic. What set these protests apart from previous events in 2009, 2017, and 2019, was not only their duration and intensity, but also the scale of the information manipulation online.
In previous protests, the government relied mainly on two strategies: restricting communications and limiting the flow of information to official media. In 2009, SMS services were disrupted. In 2019, the internet was shut down nationwide for a week to ensure that state media could have control over the narratives. In 2022, a full internet shutdown was no longer technically or economically feasible; instead, the authorities applied a different strategy: building an active online presence to directly shape narratives. Prior to the nationwide protests, significant public funds had already been allocated to cyber operations, state-affiliated media content production, and “information security” efforts that empowered security agencies, state media, and even religious institutions to influence narratives on social platforms. In the 2020 and 2021 budgets, large sums were officially allocated under “cyberspace security,” “countering enemy cyber operations,” and “online content production.”
Factnameh’s review of 88 protest-related fact-checks published between September 2022 and September 2023 identified six recurring disinformation patterns deployed by Iranian authorities and pro-government networks during the protests.
1. Parallel Narratives
The most complex pattern was the creation of parallel narratives—alternative explanations designed to challenge widely accepted accounts from families, eyewitnesses, and independent sources. These narratives filled the information gaps created by censorship and the lack of free reporting.
Common features:
Focus on high-profile victims whose stories shaped public opinion (e.g., Nika Shakarami, Sarina Esmailzadeh, Kian Pirfalak).
Use of multiple amplifiers: officials, state media outlets, and pro-government social media accounts.
Forced televised interviews with families, later rejected by the same families in safer settings.
Release of information in small fragments (“drip-feeding”) to sustain ambiguity.
Engagement of loyal “investigative” accounts to mimic independent verification.
These narratives often claimed victims died by suicide, accidents, substance poisoning, or unrelated criminal incidents—even when families or evidence indicated they were killed during protests. The same approach was applied to deaths in detention and to other sensitive incidents, such as the Evin prison fire or the assault on female protesters in Tehran’s Sadr High School.
The purpose of parallel narratives was not necessarily to produce a convincing alternative but to create enough doubt to challenge the dominant public narrative.
2. Denial of Documented Facts
A second major pattern was the denial of verified, visible, and documented facts, especially regarding state violence.
Key examples:
Officials repeatedly claimed that morality police agents carried no batons or weapons, despite extensive documentation showing otherwise.
Security agencies denied using live ammunition despite clear video evidence.
State media insisted that no protesters were killed, even when independent organizations had verified more than 500 deaths.
This denial strategy sought to undermine evidence by ignoring it, reframing it, or replacing it with vague counter-claims such as blaming “infiltrators” or “fake police”
3. False Flag Operations
False flag operations are actions carried out by governments against themselves to blame an enemy or rival. The Iranian security forces have a history of such operations.
The 1999 Mashhad bombing was initially blamed on government opponents, but months later, the Intelligence Ministry stated it was carried out by an internal “deviant faction.” Similar suspicion arose after the Shahcheragh attack in Shiraz. Governments also use fabricated news to discredit opponents. Russia and the USSR frequently used this tactic to undermine public trust in rivals’ claims.
Patterns in the 2022–23 protests:
Anonymous accounts are creating and spreading fake news.
Misleading content presented as real images targeting regime opponents.
Mass “fact-checking” reports claiming to debunk false information.
Media narratives citing fake reports to discredit real reporting.
Examples:
Fake subtitles attributed to Iran International TV about the Evin prison fire.
Misattributed images of shop closures framed as strikes in other cities.
Fake “MP letters” denying real parliament calls for protester executions.
Instagram story excerpts falsely linked to BBC Persian.
Irrelevant protest images circulated widely, first by anonymous accounts, then amplified by supporters.
Evidence shows these media false flag operations were systematically used to confuse and discredit political activists and independent reporting.
4. Pseudo-Fact-Checking
Another tactic in the disinformation campaign is creating content that mimics fact-checking or media analysis. These materials look scientific and credible, but their methods and data are often unreliable. Charts, infographics, geolocation maps, or big datasets may seem convincing but are misleading if not verifiable.
Early Examples in Protests:
Reports claiming to analyze “fake news” from foreign media were based on unclear methods and flawed or inaccessible data. Some posts labelled as “fake” were in fact, verified news.
A supporter presented CCTV images and geolocations to claim the 10-year-old Kian Pirfalak was killed by protesters; in reality, the images and maps were misleading.
Alleged studies of IP addresses claimed 80% of anti-regime commenters were from abroad, though such large-scale identification is technically impossible.
Common Patterns in Pseudo-Fact-Checking:
Use of “pseudo-data” (charts, infographics, maps, distorted indicators)
References to unclear sources (“specialized studies”)
Drawing conclusions that serve a desired narrative
These methods are designed to mislead, discredit foreign media, and support government narratives.
5. Inverted Portrayal
One of the regime’s early responses to Mahsa Amini’s death and the protests was to present false information about the situation and the people’s demands, creating a distorted image in which Iran appears ethical, democratic, and aligned with popular will.
Target Audience: Usually foreign audiences, through international media and speeches. A secondary goal is to shape domestic perceptions by portraying Western societies in a negative light.
Common Approaches:
Downplaying protests and offering false interpretations
Making broad claims about popular satisfaction with the government
Using Iran’s elections as symbols of democracy
Highlighting abstract concepts like independence or resistance as national values
Citing vague principles from the Constitution
Referencing inaccurate reports or unreliable polls
Making false claims about other countries
Recent Examples:
President Raisi told CBS that the hijab is voluntarily observed and that Iranian women support it.
At the UN, Raisi claimed democracy is fully institutionalized in Iran.
Foreign Minister Amir-Abdollahian and other officials claimed Iran is fully democratic or that 80% of citizens support compulsory hijab.
The regime also falsely claims women in Western countries face greater oppression, using fabricated statistics and selective narratives to criticize the West.
These narratives aim to normalize the regime domestically and abroad, while undermining reports of protests, repression, and human rights violations.
6. Exaggeration and Minimization
A recurring propaganda pattern during the 1401 protests was to exaggerate events favourable to the government and downplaying events against it.
Common Approaches:
Exaggerate anything that supports the regime
Minimize what is not in favour of the regime
Use ratios, scales, and figures to distort perception
Examples:
Pro-government rallies: On the anniversary of the 1979 Revolution, the newspaper Hamshahri claimed 21 million participants, roughly one in four Iranians. However, this figure is implausible given the cities’ capacities and visual evidence.
Opposition protests abroad: The 22 October protest in Berlin was described by Fars News as small, despite being one of Germany’s largest political gatherings.
Police actions: Abdullah Ganji, head of Hamshahri, minimized the Morality Police, has only five cars at its service in Tehran, two of which are not operable, contrary to documented evidence.
Student protests: Former police chief Hossein Ashtari claimed only 1% of students protested. While technically small in percentage, this still represents roughly 150,000 students, a significant number.
These tactics distort public perception by inflating support for the regime and downplaying opposition, creating a skewed narrative both domestically and internationally.
The 2022 protests revealed a highly coordinated disinformation system within the Islamic Republic, a blend of state media, security agencies, and unofficial cyber networks. Understanding these six patterns can help assess information flows, human rights risks, and the broader strategic communication environment inside Iran.